


The Ventotene Papers

D. Grace G. Montani J. Pinder

**CLIMATE CHANGE
AND FEDERALISM**



**THE ALTIERO SPINELLI INSTITUTE
FOR FEDERALIST STUDIES**

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This *Ventotene Paper*, dedicated to the issue of climate change or, more explicitly, to the impending ecological crisis, has been through a long incubation period, as the exchange of letters on “Ecology and Federalism” in the *Appendix* testify.

Indeed the authors of the *Ventotene Manifesto* could not have considered the ecological issue one of the motivations of the battle for a European Federation. The first politically important debates on the ecological crisis dated back to the beginning of the 70s of the Twentieth Century. Nonetheless, in so far as the ecological problem has gained global proportions, federalists have tried to extend the scope of the federalist project even to the solution of environmental issues or, more precisely, to the problem of the future of life on our Planet. The idea of European Federalism, as the *Ventotene Manifesto* testifies, was originated with a cosmopolitan vocation. It is quite natural for federalists to defend the ecological cause without reserve. However, up to now, national governments and international policy dealing with the environment has ignored the federalist perspective. Many believe that intergovernmental cooperation is enough to save the Planet from catastrophe. In truth, it is this conventional belief that is leading humankind to the chasm.

This booklet claims that an alliance between ecologists and federalists is more than ever necessary, as is clear from the evidence David Grace, an environmentalist and federalist, gave at the seminar on “Climate Change and the Future of Federalism: Europe, India and the World” organised by the James Madison Trust and the Center for Federal Studies of the University of Kent, in Canterbury, from June 29th to July 1st 2007. During this seminar, John Pinder systematically presented his theses on the creation of a Global Climate Community, by an initial nucleus formed by the European Union and India, as happened in Europe

with the creation of the ECSC by France and Germany. Guido Montani has, on the other hand, presented the proposal of a Carbon tax, as a first form of intervention to support, within the UN framework, a plan for sustainable development worldwide. The two strategies, here discussed, are not at all two alternatives, as the history of European integration shows. Those who intend to act in view of a radical political project must exploit the circumstances that history offers them. What is truly important is that a first step in the right direction is to be made and the authors of the essays here presented are all convinced that the European Union should take the initiative.

The Editor

Ventotene, August 2008

The Development of European Environment Policy

David Grace

In this paper I shall try to establish three things: firstly, that environmental problems escape the control of national governments and require not merely international but supranational federal solutions; secondly, that the European Union has been able to take more effective action on environmental problems than its member-states acting alone; thirdly, that the role of the ordinary citizen, active through non-governmental organisations, has been crucial in the development of European environmental policy.

In the 1950s the environment did not figure at all in political debate and was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. The economic objectives set out in the treaty were not tempered at all by reference to the environment. In 1962, the year when as a schoolboy I gave my first speech in favour of British membership of what we all called the Common Market, my headmaster gave me a copy of a newly published book, "*Silent Spring*" by Rachel Carson. Although at the time I didn't read it, I now realise that it marked the beginning of public awareness of environmental problems, beyond the ranks of dedicated conservationists. The British parliament was slow to pick up the theme. The first mention of environmental pollution in Hansard occurs in 1969. 1970 was designated European Conservation Year, launched in February by 300 participants from 24 European countries at a conference in Strasbourg. In the same year the newly-elected Prime Minister, Edward Heath, created the Department of the Environment. Peter Walker, the first Secretary of State for the Environment used to claim that the name was chosen because having first decided to call it the Department for Living, Heath had realised that this would make Walker Secretary of State for life. The Queen's speech that year also referred to the environment.

In 1972 Stockholm hosted the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, which began with a service including five sermons, the longest of which lasted 35 minutes and was on the theme, "Why Job had boils". The European Communities responded with a declaration by the Heads of State and Government on the environment, part of which stated:

"Economic expansion is not an end in itself... As befits the genius of Europe, particular attention will be given to intangible values and to protecting the environment, so that progress may really be put at the service of mankind."

The European Commission gave effect to this declaration in 1973 by drawing up the First Action Programme on the environment embodying eleven principles including:

(1) prevention of damage to the environment at source rather than combating it after the event; ...

(5) costs of avoidance and removal of environmental nuisances to be paid for in principle by the person causing it; ...

(10) in the case of every form of pollution the most appropriate level for taking action must be established.

At the time I was a member of the Labour Party but in 1974 at the invitation of friends I attended my first Liberal Party Conference in Brighton where the main debate was between the radical advocates of no growth and the pragmatists who argued for limited growth. The other parties were not debating the environment and given the Liberals' enthusiastic endorsement of European integration (they even used the word federal) I joined the party. In the same year the European Environmental Bureau was formed.

Across Europe, countries began to recognise the environmental dimension. The first national constitution to embody the idea was, surprisingly, the Greek constitution of 1974, article 24 of which gives the state a duty to protect the environment. Article 66 of the Portugese constitution adopted in the same year stated:

“Everyone should have the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced human environment.”

Some years later in 1982 the new article 21 of the Dutch constitution gave a peculiarly lowland twist by requiring the state:

“...to keep the country habitable ... and to protect and improve the environment.”

Meanwhile there was no specific legal base for environmental action by the European Communities so that any legislation had to be adopted under Article 235 (general power) or Article 95 of the Treaty of Rome (single market) both of which required unanimity among Member States. Of course at this time the unelected European Parliament was only consulted. Under these provisions the European Communities adopted their first environmental laws, the Bathing Water Directive of 1975 and the Birds Directive of 1979. Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands took the lead in promoting environmental protection at European level. In the German case at least, one motive was to level the playing field because national legislation had imposed uncompetitive costs on German industry. There was also a wider interest across the Communities in ensuring that Member States did not use national legislation supposedly designed for environmental protection as a means of trade protection. The classic case on this point was German regulation of noise pollution by lawnmowers, which gave German manufacturers an advantage over their rivals exporting to Germany.

In 1977 the Young European Federalists (JEF) meeting in Berlin adopted their first manifesto with explicit references to the environment. The German young federalists, chaired by Jo Leinen (later to become Saarland's Minister of the Environment and now a member of the European Parliament) took the lead in this. In 1979 JEF hosted a European Youth Parliament bringing together representatives of political youth movements from across Europe to discuss the environment. This conference was addressed by Stanley Johnson, Head of the European Commission's Division for the Prevention of Pollution.

Ten years later in 1987, after a period when the Communities had appeared to be in the doldrums, the Single European Act (SEA) was adopted. SEA is most widely known for the target of a single market by 1992 and the constitutional changes which made that possible. It also contained the first constitutional recognition of the environment with the explicit objective:

“...to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment”.

For the first time there was a specific legal base for environmental legislation but it still required unanimity. SEA also contained the first mention of subsidiarity in an amendment to the EEC Treaty:

“...the Community shall take action relating to the environment if a problem can be better solved at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States” (EEC Treaty Article 130r(4)).

SEA also recognised that the Community would have an external role:

“Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the relevant international organisations” (EEC Treaty Article 130r(5)).

By now it was generally agreed that in some areas environmental action at European level would be more effective than national action. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty recognised this by making environmental legislation subject to the Co-operation procedure, requiring a Qualified Majority Vote in the Council of Ministers instead of unanimity. However, whilst it would now be easier to adopt European environmental legislation, there was a decline in the political will of national governments to do so. A number of factors have been adduced to explain this, including

the costs of German re-unification, growth in unemployment and increased global competition. For whatever reason the inspiration for new environmental law now passed to the voluntary sector and its various lobbies.

The European Commission is not a monolith and the importance of environmental politics to the byzantine struggles within the European Commission also changed. Before there was a legal base for European action, the Commission had established a small division to deal with prevention of environmental pollution, headed by Stanley Johnson. In the 1980s the Directorate-General for Environmental Policy (once known as DG XI) was established but the environment was still not regarded as an important portfolio for a European Commissioner. This changed when Carlo Ripa di Meana was Commissioner (1985-1992) and became a thorn in the side of the British government. Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, was struggling hard to persuade the British government to view the European Union more positively, when Ripa di Meana, with the active support of British environmentalists, sought to impose the provisions of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive on proposals to build the Winchester by-pass. This was one of the first struggles between the Commission and a powerful Member State over the enforcement of European environmental legislation. As with other areas of European policy, legislation has not only to be adopted, but effectively transposed and then enforced. The Commission's record on enforcement is patchy and the resources devoted to it insufficient, although at some time or other the Commission has brought infringement proceedings against every Member State.

After Ripa di Meana's strong line, national governments sought a quieter Environment Commissioner in Ioannis Paleokrassas who, coming from a business background with no record in environmental politics, concentrated on green accountability and avoided high-level disputes. He was succeeded by Ritt Bjerregard, who was controversial for many reasons, not least her dismissal of the European Parliament as "not a real parliament" even before her appointment was confirmed. She was confronted with a decision which epitomised the conflict between economic

and environmental objectives. As part of its plans to develop the new *länder*, the German government wanted to build the North German Motorway (A 20) through two valleys with the highest level of protection under European legislation on species and habitat conservation. Bjerregard resolved the dilemma by allowing the route through one valley but insisting that it avoided the other. The only logic to this decision was political as both valleys had the same level of protection. Whilst conservationists saw this as a failure of nerve, the Commission saw it as a victory over a powerful member-state. Bjerregard herself pointed out how environmental policy cut across every other issue:

“I am a bit like someone in charge of a car park where none of the issues which are parked there under the name of the environment are really ones I could call my own. In reality they are in fact issues which really need to be resolved elsewhere by some of my other Commission colleagues.”

The struggles between different objectives and different directorates-general in the Commission are also played out within national governments. The gatherings of Environment Ministers in the Council of Ministers sometimes strengthened those ministers' hands when dealing with colleagues at home. At other times, other ministries kept a watchful eye on their environmental colleagues. Thus in negotiations on the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, the German environmental ministry representative was always accompanied by two “chaperones”, from the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Economics “...to make sure that the Ministry for the Environment did not go too far in Brussels” (Pehle, 1997). In Britain, it was becoming clear to politicians that environmental politics were important to the electorate. The performance of the British Green Party in the European elections of 1989 underlined this, when they obtained 14.5% of the vote. The two largest non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the UK are the National Trust, which conserves both architecture and landscape, and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), each of which

has around one million members, far more than any political party. When John Selwyn-Gummer was environment minister in John Major's government (1992-1997), he would regularly discuss the agenda of Council meetings with RSPB's director before attending them as well as contacting her after meetings took place.

The European Parliament decided to set up an Environment Committee in 1973. It was the twelfth specialist committee, added to those set up since the European Parliament first met in 1952. Today the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee has sixty-eight members and is served by a secretariat of ten administrators. Ken Collins, a Scottish Labour MEP and subsequent Director of the Scottish Environment Agency, chaired the committee for many years and built up its importance during the 1990s from a "Cinderella" committee to one of the Parliament's most powerful. As he commented on the parliament himself:

"In 1979, we were a talking shop, an assembly without teeth. By 1994 we had learnt to do some damage with our gums. Now we have developed some pretty ferocious teeth."

Many of those teeth belonged to the Environment Committee. From 1993 to 1995 I lobbied that committee and with their help was able to break through secrecy and deception by the European Commission and block attempts by the French government supported by Commission President, Jacques Delors, to weaken conservation legislation.

The European Union's often forgotten institution, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), has also played a significant role in the development of European Environmental Policy. To take one significant example, the Danish bottle case of 1988, the court established that environmental protection legislation could sometimes override the basic principle of free movement of goods. Over the years a body of jurisprudence has grown out of the case law seeking to establish the distinction between trade protection (not permitted) and environmental protection (permitted). The

court has also played a useful role in enforcement of European environmental legislation. In general only the European Commission can initiate enforcement proceedings, but in many cases environmental activists have been able to cite European law in national courts. National courts have then referred to the ECJ for their interpretation of the law. There still remain two areas of difficulty. Firstly, the Commission has had to take action against all Member States to enforce transposition of European directives into national law. Member States who have tried to defend their failure to transpose legislation on the ground that the Commission has no competence to propose certain directives have been forced to present their arguments to the court and not just in the Council of Ministers. Secondly, there can be problems of enforcement in Member States with federal systems when the federal government agrees to EU legislation which lower levels of government have to implement. Nevertheless, as one observer commented:

“Community directives and regulations place more detailed requirements on Member States than do Canadian or Australian laws. The European Commission and the ECJ do more to enforce EU environmental law than do the central authorities of Australia or Canada or Germany” (Kelemen, 2000).

Two main issues have arisen across the wide range of European environmental policy. Firstly and inevitably, the question of subsidiarity is raised time and again. The wording of Article 130r(4): “...the Community shall take action relating to the environment if a problem can be better solved at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States” leaves great scope for conflicting interpretation. A major example was the blocking by the British and other governments of Delors’ proposals for an eco-tax. Secondly, different Member States favour different approaches to environmental regulation. Thus, the German government has generally sought to control the *means* and the sources of pollution whereas the British government usually seeks to control *ends* through quality standards. Both approaches can be found in European legislation at different times.

There can be no dispute that the competence of the European Union for environmental matters has grown greatly since the time of the Treaty of Rome. Is this just a reflection of the growing salience of environmental issues over the same period? After all national governments also developed their instruments for environmental policy. Yet there are several additional reasons why competence at European level grew.

Firstly, there were environmental problems which could not be solved at national level. The most obvious of these is trans-frontier pollution, obvious to inhabitants of regions bordering the Rhine if nowhere else. It was questionable whether the Drinking Water and Bathing Water Directives of 1975 could be justified on this basis, but it was argued at the time. All Member States accepted that conservation of migratory wild birds could not be achieved nationally and thus the Birds Directive was adopted unanimously in 1979.

Secondly, it quickly became clear that Member States could use environmental protection as a smokescreen for measures of trade protection and thus inhibit and delay the achievement of Europe's primary objective, the Single Market. Through a series of cases brought by the Commission and Member States, the European Court of Justice developed the criteria for distinguishing between genuine environmental measures and disguised trade protectionism. This same issue is played out on the world stage, at first in the deliberations of the GATT Disputes Panel (see for example the case of the USA's Marine Mammals Protection Act) and now within the World Trade Organisation, but so far there is no agreed jurisprudence at global level to resolve conflict as the ECJ does within the EU.

Thirdly, there has been overwhelming public support for EU environmental competence. Even in Eurosceptic Britain, 62% of the public believe that the EU should act on environmental matters. This figure rises to 84% when people are asked who should act on climate change (Eurobarometer 2006). Nor is this support theoretical. Through elections and, above all, through membership of and funding for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) the public has influenced the development of environ-

mental policy at EU level, and not only policy. NGOs have been effective at amending proposed legislation and obtaining the enforcement of adopted legislation.

The greatest of current environmental challenges, climate change, has provoked further development in this field. Member States having become accustomed to working together on environmental policy within the European Union, now work together on the same questions in global discussions. The EU took a common line in the Kyoto Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1997 and led the debate which produced the protocols named after it. Those protocols set targets for the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases and the EU accepted a collective target rather than national ones. Subsequent negotiations within the EU allowed a degree of burden-sharing between Member States to take account of different levels of development rather than a simple proportionate target for each. This was a great achievement and showed an unexpected and rarely acknowledged solidarity.

The development of European environmental policy shows that federal government is not a theoretical or utopian concept but a real response to real problems.

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Europe, Federalism and Ecology

Guido Montani

The ecological challenge

Awareness of a possible collapse of the biosphere is spreading amongst all the peoples of the world, who are becoming more and more united thanks to modern communication networks. The most urgent problem, and the one on which attention is focused at present, is climate change. In more general terms, there is an increasing, scientifically-based understanding of the role that humankind plays in the history of nature. The universe and the biosphere, too, have their own history, of which the history of humankind is only a tiny part. The premises of many cultural and religious traditions are shaken by a more and more accurate knowledge of the origins of the human species and its evolution. Thanks to intense fieldwork, today it is possible to show that humankind colonized the planet in an extremely short period of time compared to geological time and to the time taken for the evolution of other living species, creating patterns of cohabitation – the different civilisations – which have made it possible to exploit natural resources most effectively, in order to improve their well-being. The triumphant advance of the industrial revolution from the continent of Europe to the whole world – globalization – is the most tangible sign of the “natural” propensity of every individual and every people to use ever more efficient institutions and techniques for transforming animal, vegetable and mineral resources into goods that are of use for the development of the species.

The exponential increase in humankind’s power over nature would have been impossible without the intellectual achievements of modern science. Two sectors of social life have made the biggest contribution to this: the political system, which im-

mediately realized how useful science and technology were for increasing the state's capacity for taking the offensive or defending itself, and the economic system, grounded on competition between businesses that are incessantly involved in research and in the use of technologies for reducing the cost of producing goods and services. Nonetheless, science has never been a passive tool in the hands of the power system, whether political or economic. The quest to discover the laws of nature and those that regulate human society has frequently been pursued by single individuals, whose motives were simply to gain a more perfect knowledge of physical and social reality and not to scale the heights of power. If public opinion throughout the world is at present discussing the issue of ecology, this is thanks to a few natural scientists who have realized the gravity of the matter and have succeeded in drawing the attention of citizens to the fact that the systematic destruction of the natural environment in which humankind has developed – the biosphere – depends on anthropic causes. Scientists rightly point out that the exploitation of nature cannot go beyond certain physical limits. Today these limits are constantly violated. To impose respect for them, both the political and the economic systems, as well as production techniques, need to be radically reformed. The ecological issue is thus, by its very nature, an interdisciplinary one.

Our attention must therefore focus on the interaction between science, economy and politics. The scientists' role can be that of countering the power systems of economics and politics. They defend the vital interests of living beings that lack the power of speech. Their aim is to maintain the ecological balances necessary for the survival of life in the biosphere. In order to draw up an ecological policy, we cannot do without the active contribution of natural scientists. The economic system is certainly not designed to meet these needs. Since the distant past, the market has stood as a meeting place for people who have goods to sell and buyers who intend purchasing them. The conservation of nature has never been amongst the objectives pursued by the economic system. Natural resources are used by those who wish to exploit them, free of charge or at a certain price (the price is rent)

if they belong to others, as happens for land, mines, etc.. We should therefore not be surprised by statements such as: “Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest and widest-ranging *market failure* ever seen” (Stern Review, 2007). The market fails because it did not come into being in order to protect nature but for other reasons. Through the market and the industrial system necessary for the production of goods, the members of the human community have endeavoured to satisfy their need for primary and luxury items. Amongst goods in demand individually, the conservation of the natural environment might, at the most, represent the satisfaction of aesthetic demands. Yet aesthetic enjoyment might even involve the destruction of the natural environment (such as draining a marsh, at the cost of some species of marsh-dwelling animals, in order to make a garden). Today the economic system has assumed a global dimensions, thanks to modern communication and transport techniques. No inhabitable ground escapes planetary interdependence.

Nevertheless, if the political system did not intervene to regulate it, the economic system would function difficulty, with serious crises of over- or under-production. Environmental crises are a particular by-product of the world economic system (an external diseconomy). Complex as the relationship between the state and the market may be, in the modern world it is impossible to conceive of a market without a state or of a state without a market, even though the state-market models of interdependence are very different in the USA, Europe, China, Russia, Japan, Brazil, etc.. It might thus be argued that humankind’s mad rush towards the destruction of the environment also represents: “the greatest and widest-ranging *political failure* ever seen”. We have to acknowledge the failure of the international political system. The world political system is structurally unable to respond to the ecological challenge, because states are organizations that have arisen in the history of humankind to guarantee, above all, the lives of members of a certain political community, both against other members of the community and against threats from outside enemies, i.e. from other states. This primary ob-

jective of the state has been joined by others throughout history, such as the respect of certain basic rights, like right to personal freedom, an increasing economic and political equality, etc.. But the prime function of the state, the guarantee of the right to life, is fundamental and when the state no longer manages to assume this responsibility, we are plunged into a state of anarchy: the war of all against all.

The clearest sign of political failure is the growing inability of the state to guarantee the right to life. An irreversible ecological crisis looms on the horizon in the form of a threat that no sovereign state – sovereign of what? – is capable of stopping. A global threat can only be dealt with by a world environmental government. The right to life today is an expression devoid of sense if it does not embrace the right to life of all non-human beings, vegetable and animal. Humankind will have no future unless biological life on earth has a future.

In the current political debate an attempt is being made to come to a worldwide policy through co-operation between governments, with the help of the bodies that can make this possible, first and foremost the UN. What we set out to demonstrate here, is that this attempt is not sufficient. Co-operation between governments is frequently ineffective or impossible without supra-governmental institutions. The interdependence between states and markets must be reconsidered in an international framework if a satisfactory answer is to be found to the ecological challenge. To deal with this complex problem, it is useful to take the process of European integration as a reference point. Starting from the immediate post-war period, Europe has developed a supranational system of government able to represent not only a model for new international relations, but also the power basis necessary for starting to construct a world government.

Europe is more and more involved in the struggle for a sustainable development. The debate on the future of the planet opened in the UN at the beginning of the Seventies. The European Union recognized the environment issue as part of its objectives for the first time in the Single European Act of 1987. Since then, the Union's commitment to sustainable development

has grown, particularly at world conferences such as the *Earth Summit* in Rio in 1992, and the *World Summit on Sustainable Development*, in Johannesburg, in 2002. However, it was its firm stand on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) that made the European Union world leader in the fight against atmospheric pollution, outstripping the United States who have “abdicated” from their position on this front (Vogler, 2005, p. 837, and Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005).

The European Union’s world leadership on the environmental front is less visible than the leadership it has obtained on the monetary and commercial one. Nonetheless, it consists of real power, even though this is not sufficient in itself to affirm that the Union has become a world power, since it remains a dwarf in military terms, particularly when compared to the USA. The creation of a – European and worldwide – market for trading emission permits (ETS, *Emission Trading System*) was made possible thanks to the existence of a European supranational government, the Commission, which, since the Common Market, had already obtained the powers necessary to regulate the Union’s internal and external trade. The market for trading emission permits is a federal institution. However, what we set out to do here is not to examine what Europe must do to increase its world power, but what it must do to achieve sustainable development for itself and for the world. If, in applying these policies, it also increases its influence in the balance of world power, this is a less important issue. The ecological challenge regards the conservation of life on the Planet and thus the future of humanity. In this sense, it is not a classic problem of international power balances, such as those that the so-called political “realists” like to discuss.

Europe, an open federal state

The process of European integration is the supranational manifestation of the historical crisis of European states. Its cultural roots can be traced back to the political currents active in

the European Resistance movement which, as an alternative to the dramas caused by the division into sovereign nation states, planned a post-war Europe that was to be united in peace and freedom. The institutional launch of the integration process came with the ECSC, a supranational political Community, limited to the coal and steel sectors. The ECSC experience influenced all further European development. The ECSC possessed the features of a gradual construction – “les premières assises de la Fédération européenne,” we read in the Schuman declaration – grounded on an institutional nucleus with a distinct federal stamp to it. The High Authority had real supranational powers, although limited to the area of interest. The dual characteristic of Community building, despite the events and crises of the integration process, has lasted up to the present. The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954 put an end to the political phase of integration but the Treaty of Rome gave rise to an economic Community which maintained the basic supranational and ongoing aspects of the ECSC.

Nevertheless, the long process of economic integration, from the Common Market (1957) to the implementation of a European currency (2002), has made the political objectives of European integration less and less clear. Integration has proceeded on the basis of institutional responses to the specific challenges while the political class that has gradually taken control of the ongoing process has proved to be increasingly less aware of its significance. When, after the end of the Cold War, Europe was obliged to face up to new, global challenges – ones which demanded a foreign and security policy, an efficient government of the Monetary Union and, lastly, a plan for the ecological conversion of the production and consumer system – the disorientation of the political class produced uncertain institutional solutions that were unclear to citizens, as is shown by the crisis of the European Constitution project. A potential step forward in the construction of a political Union has turned into an unsolvable brainteaser. The national governments are unable to find a solution to the European dilemma. On the one hand, they cannot help maintaining and improving Community institutions, yet, on

the other, they wish to keep their remaining sovereign powers pretty much intact, particularly those of a military and fiscal nature. It is clear that, seen in these terms, there is no solution to the problem. It is impossible to have more European unity unless some national sovereign power is given up.

In this political framework, academic debate is not helping to solve the European dilemma (for a survey, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). Despite the numerous schools studying the European problem, the main opinion is that the European Union is a political entity *sui generis*, since it is neither an international organization, nor a federal state. This statement is justified if we take it to refer to Europe in its present state of integration, in which some institutions of a federal nature, such as the Commission, the European Parliament, the European currency and the Court of Justice, exist alongside other traditional inter-governmental institutions. Nonetheless, if considered as a model for political action, the concept of Europe as a political entity *sui generis* means abandoning European construction to a blind clash between the forces involved – governments, parties, corporations, civil society organisations, etc.. Without a clear institutional perspective, i.e. without a democratic model of a supranational political community, choices will be imposed by the “reason” of the strongest, including the choice of a slow disintegration: a wide market in a continent without a political identity. It would be a clear change of direction compared to the original European project, which was initiated on a federal basis for the very purpose of preventing the relationships between European states from being based once more on power politics. Without a clear project for the future of Europe, the newly unified Germany would once again become a problem and, perhaps a nightmare, for other European peoples. The obstinate past which does not pass is not a German problem, but a European one.

This is why, for those political forces that intend to continue the process of European unification in the perspectives outlined by the Resistance, the hypothesis that it would seem most reasonable to pursue is that of Europe as an open federal state. There is some justification for the accusation that the anti-fed-

eralists make towards pro-European forces – but lacking a clear view of where they wish to get to – of wishing to build a European super-state, “an ever closer union”. All existing federations – the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Germany, Australia etc. – are founded on the real or imagined existence of a national people. The history of the United States, the first federation in history, is a clear example. The fact that the thirteen original colonies were already conceived of by the founding fathers as thirteen parts of a nation, emerges clearly from the political debate fuelling the fight to create the Federation. American citizens’ identification with the nation became even more evident after the civil war. The victory of the North over the secessionists from the South would never have been able to lead to greater political unity unless they – North and South – had shared the cement of national ideology. In fact, after recovering national unity, the United States ceased to extend their frontiers and include new populations and became a closed national people in the world arena, in the same way as other nations. The United States presented themselves to the world as the heralds of democracy, but as a model of national democracy only. As regards international relations, they coined the ideology of democratic internationalism. Thanks to their economic and military power, they were able to introduce certain new principles into the international order, first through Wilson and then through Roosevelt. They replaced the old concept of the balance of power, approved by the Congress of Vienna, with a model of relations between nations founded on intergovernmental co-operation, such as the League of Nations and the UN. However, a “world government”, formed by those powers (the Security Council) with more powers and responsibilities than others, is necessary to make international co-operation work. Co-operation between governments, in the US internationalist ideology, is founded on political hegemony.

Instead, European unification is founded on the federal principle of supra-nationality, i.e. on the transfer of power from nation states to a European government, in order to guarantee to the member states equal dignity and equal powers. Federalism guar-

antees unity in diversity, on the basis of shared, democratic rules. In fact, the Community method – consisting in a co-legislative decision shared by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers and in the executive responsibility entrusted to the Commission – is none other than the federal method, as explained clearly by Jean Monnet in his speech at the inauguration of the ECSC (Monnet, 1955, p. 58). The fact that the original federal nucleus has been kept intact during the process of European integration has allowed Community institutions to adapt more flexibly to the contingent challenges, determining a search for institutional solutions compatible with the conservation of this nucleus, both within the Union and outside it. Today, the novelty of Europe's model is becoming evident in external relations. As European unity was conceived of as a political project necessary for overcoming the dramas caused by sovereign nation states, in its foreign relations Europe is concerned to establish relations with other states that are based on co-operation and, if possible, on common institutions founded on the principle of equal dignity and equal powers. Europe cannot apply the model of a closed federal state in its international relations, using the corresponding power politics in relation to others, because Europe is not a nation but a plurality of national peoples, who will never agree to merge into a single national identity. This is why the European Federation is unable to define the geographical borders for its people. The European people is an open pluri-national people.

Today the issue of European borders stands at the centre of political debate, particularly as far as Turkey is concerned. But other countries are also knocking at the door, such as the Ukraine, Georgia and, perhaps, in the not too distant future, other Mediterranean countries. The issue cannot be settled on the basis of geographical identity but only on the basis of common values and shared institutions. This is why the European Constitution, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is essential. The true dividing line between those who wish to be Europeans and those who wish to remain outside, can only be a constitutional pact. Of course the European Union

cannot extend to the whole world. But, even towards their neighbours, Europe's policy distinguishes itself from traditional foreign policy. The Union is concerned to establish sound, neighbourly relations, unlike national powers in the past, who considered those on the other side of the border as their enemies. Moreover, in its relations with African countries (ACP), the European Union has decided to create common institutions with equal standing, including an intercontinental Parliament. Similar initiatives have been launched with Mediterranean countries, with the creation of a Mediterranean Parliament. With respect to political situations that are geographically further removed, such as Latin America and the Asian countries, the tendency of the Union is to "institutionalize" relations as far as possible. A clear example is the recent agreement on strategic cooperation with India, where a chapter regarding "institutional architecture" (Commission of the European Communities, 2004) is foreseen. It is therefore conceivable that relations between the EU and India in the area of environmental protection may evolve to the point of forming a supranational community for sustainable development (Pinder 1999).

We shall now set out to show how, even limiting ourselves to an examination of environmental issues, Europe can take effective action in order to improve the rules of the international political system and accelerate the construction of the first institutions for world government. Essentially, as long as Europe strengthens its federal powers of government, she also contributes to building a world order based on peaceful cooperation between states, and progressively overcoming the present system based on international hegemony.

A federal government of the environment

To outline the policies that the European Union must implement to guarantee the Planet's sustainable development, it is necessary to take into consideration the scientific debate on alternative technologies to those now adopted in industrialized and de-

veloping countries. The present technologies derive from those conceived in times when the ecological problem was inexistent or had not yet been perceived. The debate on alternative technologies takes place amongst natural scientists from different fields, such as physics, chemistry, biology and interferes, for their implementation, with economics, sociology and politics. Social scientists must therefore adopt a far more general point of view, open to all the various solutions debated, yet precise enough to facilitate the choices possible. The search for alternative technologies regards almost all production methods and obviously involves the very structure of consumption and the daily lifestyle of billions of people. Amongst these issues, a particularly important one is that of energy sources, since the urgent problem is global warming, due to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by certain fuels. As regards the search for renewable energy sources, the position assumed by James Lovelock (2006) is particularly courageous, as he warns us against facile optimism about the feasibility of significant technical changes able to produce a drastic reduction in GHGs in the coming decades. Atmospheric pollution seems to have reached alarming levels that may suggest the beginning of a serious and irreversible crisis. In this perspective, Lovelock suggests considering the use of energy produced by nuclear fission, although opposed by many environmental movements, since it is the only source that might allow for a drastic reduction in carbon dioxide emissions over the coming, decisive decades. Alarm about the gravity of the environmental crisis seems to have been confirmed by the recent decisions taken by the European Council (March 2007), which have adopted the objective of limiting temperature rise to no more than 2°C above the pre-industrial level over the century. The Council maintains that the world market of trading emissions permits represents the ideal tool for reaching this objective and that by 2020 the industrialized countries should agree to reduce their air pollutants by 30% compared to the 1990 level. Nonetheless, the European Union commitment is to reduce emissions by 20% only, if the other industrialized countries do not agree to this. In actual fact, this amounts to ad-

mitting the inadequacy of European policies, because of the impossibility of an effective world policy shared by all the more or less industrialized countries.

In view of these general EU objectives, we shall now consider three lines of action that the Union could take to affirm its world leadership in the field of sustainable development.

The first regards the international energy market. In this field, tension is predictable in the short or medium term, both over oil supplies, coming mainly from the troubled Middle East, and over gas supplies, which Europe obtains from Russia and some Asian countries. This is a problem that follows the rules of traditional international politics (the distribution of power and wealth amongst states) and that must be solved by strengthening the Union's government capacity. The Union must speak to the world with a single voice, on energy supplies, too. This result can be obtained by conferring on the European Commission the power to regulate both the internal energy market – as happened with the Common Market and Euratom – thus creating a single, interdependent European network (Commission of the European Communities, 2007b), and the external one, conferring on the Commission the power to negotiate energy supplies for the whole of the Union. This means that individual states must cease to decide their own policies on energy, ignoring and at times putting at risk the interests of other states in the Union.

The second line of action regards the need to establish the European policy for sustainable development on solid institutional bases. The protection of life on Earth involves a vast range of human activity. The concept of sustainable development, as defined by the Brundtland Commission, has served up to now as a vague, general indication of economic and social policies. The objective of satisfying the needs of the present generations without compromising those of future generations, focuses our attention on "human needs". Nonetheless, a distinction must be made between social sustainability and ecological sustainability. Problems regarding the distribution of natural resources and wealth amongst different human communities (e.g. amongst rich and poor individuals in a certain country, or between rich and

poor countries) should be considered separately from the problem of the pressure of the human population, considered as a living species, on the natural environment and on other animal and vegetable species. If an eco-centric point of view is assumed, human development is not sustainable unless it ensures biological life on the Planet (Montani, 2007). The eco-centric point of view makes it possible to establish clear limits that must be respected by an ecological policy. This does not mean denying that there are problems of social sustainability. However, these cannot be solved until we have accurately and scientifically established the limits beyond which the biosphere is placed at risk by human activity.

If the European Union wishes to implement an effective plan for sustainable development, it must also equip itself with the right tools for doing this. It is a very long-term task, which can be compared in importance to the progressive transformation from Europe's pre-industrial state to our present welfare state, in which social problems have not only been taken up by political parties, but parliaments have been supported by some consultant bodies, such as economic-social committees. The environmental problem requires a similar approach. The state must undergo a transformation, incorporating the ecological issue at the very heart of it; in other words, we must "green the state". To allow all nature's "rights" to be claimed, those who are concerned with defending her, i.e. the scientists and representatives of ecological organisations, must be allowed to influence the decision-making processes. An "Environmental consultant committee" must be set up amongst the other organisms of the European Union, with real power in drafting the European plan for sustainable development. Of course, it will not be possible for the Environmental consultant committee to replicate the exact formula of the social committees, because scientists cannot devote themselves to working full-time for consultant bodies. The job of the scientists is to carry out research. But it is possible to create a stable network of consultants who, when the Plan is to be drafted, can – together with the organizations representing civil society – express an opinion on the limits for exploiting natural resources

and on possible checks to human activity. The most suitable time for consultation with the world of science and ecology would probably come with the presentation of the five-year financial perspective which the Union has to approve at the beginning of each legislature and which represent the broad policy lines on the government of European economy. The Plan for sustainable development and the Union's five-year financial plan should be discussed and approved at a formal joint sitting of the European Parliament and national parliaments. The Environmental consultant committee should have the power to refuse the Plan, at least once, if it should differ too obviously from the limits indicated. Public opinion would thus be informed of the contrast existing between the objectives of sustainable development and some other social or political objectives. The contrast between socially sustainable development and ecologically sustainable development must be reckoned with. Naturally, politics must have the last word in deciding general trends. But nature must have the opportunity to assert her arguments, thanks to the voice of her "representatives".

It should also be noted that the European Union already possesses the first institutions for allowing possible contrasts to be dealt with between ecological and social sustainability. As from 2007, the *European Globalisation Adjustment Fund* (EGF) should start to come into operation, with the aim of providing individual workers who are the victims of changes in the world trade structure with financial aid, in order to look for a new job, re-qualify, form a co-operative or move to a new area. It must, unfortunately, be added that the financial resources allotted to this fund are quite insufficient for the moment. However, this does not prevent us from thinking that the fund might be financially boosted, not only for the pursuit of the original financial objectives, but also for dealing with the problems of industrial restructuring which will certainly arise due to the ecological adjustment of the economy. It should thus be called *European Globalisation and Environmental Adjustment Fund* (EGEF).

The last line of action regards the need to go beyond the trading emission system (ETS), created by the European Union

in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. These limits are manifold. The most obvious is the exclusion, in practice, of the developing countries, which do not intend accepting a “roof” to their development. Thus, even admitting that industrialized countries respect the advised 30% reduction compared to 1990, by 2020 the reduction will be more than replaced by the increase in greenhouse gases in developing countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a). Moreover, 20% of European GHGs are excluded by the system (European Environment Agency, 2006, p. 19). The *cap and trade* system effectively reduces pollution caused by large businesses, whilst small businesses and domestic consumption escape the mechanism. Lastly, *cap and trade* does not provide enough encouragement for innovative new technologies, since it establishes limits that are inflexible over time.

The trading emission scheme should thus be sided by a system of eco-taxation, in particular taxes on fuels that produce carbon dioxide and equivalent pollutants. The proposal of an eco-tax had been formulated in the *White Paper* on “Growth, Competitiveness and Employment”, drawn up by the Delors Commission in 1993. However, the European Union preferred to rely on anti-pollutant measures of a legislative kind, since the adoption of eco-taxes would have required the unfeasible unanimous consensus of all the member states. This also explains why, during the course of preparatory negotiations for Kyoto, the European Commission accepted the “more flexible” solution proposed by the United States (who, however, failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol). What emerged was thus a “second best” solution for Europe (Christiansen, 2004, p. 32).

To deal globally with the environmental problem, the European Union should propose, not only to European citizens but to the whole world, a plan to combat global warming grounded on eco-taxation, for application alongside the Kyoto Protocol. This proposal would go beyond the limits of the Kyoto Protocol (for more technical details of these issues, see: Kahn and Franceschi, 2006). In particular, a world system of eco-taxation would make it possible to involve rich countries in a practical, collaborative

plan with developing countries, which are reluctant to accept a *cap and trade* system at present. Since eco-taxes should be adopted by all, or almost all, countries (perhaps according to different rates taking into account per-capita income levels), tax competition between countries is avoided and solidarity mechanisms can be created amongst countries at different stages of development. Lastly, eco-taxes would make it possible for the so-called “double dividend” to be exploited by the governments who adopt them: they penalize polluting activity (*public bad*) and can finance reductions in the cost of labour, thus raising levels of employment, or public services (*public goods*). Part of the financial resources collected in the industrialized countries should also serve to create a fund inside the UN’s system of own resources, with the aim of giving all developing countries access to the technologies and aid necessary for a sustainable world development. Considering that the European Union has managed to achieve real convergence between the rich and poor countries in the Union, with a budget of a little more than 1% of European GDP (the Structural Funds are 0.35% of the GDP), it is not inconceivable for a similar result to be obtained worldwide, although in this case the objective of making development levels converge must be accompanied by the objective of fighting climate change. The contrast between socially sustainable development and ecologically sustainable development on a world scale can lead to the failure of any policy introduced by a limited group of countries, however important they may be. It is essential to reach an agreement between rich and poor countries on a common strategy. The reasons why the developing countries refused to sign the Kyoto protocol are understandable. It is true that at present the industrialized countries enjoy the advantages obtained at the cost of the pollution they have produced in the past. But this argument does not take into consideration the fact that sooner or later the destruction of life on the Planet will involve everyone, rich and poor, in a joint tragedy. The European Union must take the responsibility for proposing a plan to fight global warming, reconciling ecological and social sustainability worldwide.

Ecology and federalism: a necessary alliance

The environmental movement, which arose in the Seventies, mainly in the USA and in Europe, soon became of international significance, since the very nature of the ecological issue is worldwide in scope. However, ecological thought, as a political ideology, developed within the old paradigm of the nation state: this was the “natural” horizon for the organization of political struggle. The environmental parties set about greening their own nation state and not yet building supranational government of the environment. But this path is proving to be increasingly unsatisfactory. Critical voices have been raised inside the environmental movement, which challenge the concept of exclusive sovereignty. The need for “inclusive sovereignty” is acknowledged, open to co-operation between governments and to supranational environmental government (Eckersley, 2005). In Europe we prefer to refer to “shared sovereignty”, but the situation under discussion is exactly the same.

The federalist movement has both a European and a worldwide basis. In Europe its roots reach back to the Resistance to nazi-fascism, and worldwide, to the threat of nuclear holocaust. The propagation of federalist movements in society is apparently less widespread than for environmental ones, because the federalists’ fight to overthrow exclusive national sovereignty develops mainly through the establishment of supranational institutions, such as the European Union or the UN, and the democratic reinforcing of them. This task is partly shared by traditional democratic political forces, occupying government positions in nation states but which, at the same time, are interested in the development of supranational institutions. The two movements’ different ways of organizing the struggle should not, however, prevent them converging on shared objectives. European federalists fight to build a European federal government, capable of speaking to the world with a single voice. If their battle for a European Constitution, which abolishes the right of veto and creates a federal government, is successful, the Union will become a model for supranational democracy and a political pole for the

construction of the first institutions of world environmental government. The European federal state will not establish itself in the a world as a new, nuclear superpower but as a centre of aggregation for those peoples that intend participating in the creation of an increasingly united world, capable of planning a sustainable future. The alliance between federalists and ecologists is thus written in the history of world politics. Life on Earth is threatened by unsustainable growth. Federalism is necessary in order to allow reason to govern the drives of a species which, in its anxiousness to improve its own well-being, is barbarically destroying all forms of life on our Planet.

Post-scriptum – There have been many new and important phenomena concerning climate change in the year that has gone by since the writing of this article and it is fitting to recall them, even briefly, to reposition the proposal for a world Carbon tax in the new context. The most significant facts concern the spectacular increase in the price of oil and many foodstuffs, a persistent confidence crisis in the financial sector generated by the collapse of the *subprimes* in the United States and a strong depreciation of the dollar against the euro. Some may claim, with some reason, that these are economic trends, without considerable connections, destined to be absorbed by long-term movements. Nonetheless, it is possible to interpret these facts also a symptoms of a structural crisis with which humankind will have to confront itself in the next decades. There are evident links among these facts. India, China, Brazil and many other countries of the so-called Third world are peremptorily inserting themselves into the global economic system. This not only implies a corresponding waning of importance and power of the old industrialised countries, but also the extraordinary absorption of energy and raw materials by those populations that intend to close the wealth gap that still separates them from the more fortunate countries. If about half the world population wants to begin to eat meat, and not only cereals, the prices of some foodstuffs will soar. If that same population uses more oil for its in-

dustries and for transport, the price of oil, a finite resource of the Planet, must rise. If the USA, in a desperate attempt to save themselves from a financial crisis, lower the interest rates and favour the depreciation of the dollar, one must not be surprised if the world is inundated by an excess of liquidity and if there is a worrying speculation for raw materials. Finally, part of the problem also derives from the first signs of exhaustion of cultivable lands because of the increasing drought, as happened in Australia for wheat.

Hence, these phenomena must be interpreted as the first signs of a structural ecological crisis humankind must face. It is not possible to prevent the almost two billion people of the world population still without electricity from claiming their right to it as other human beings do, on the basis of captious debates. Nor is it possible to underestimate the environmental disasters that will be caused by the fulfilment of these needs, if we attempt to satisfy them with the old polluting technologies we inherited from the past. Of course, the market can provide part of the answer to this challenge. In so far as the price of oil increases, substitutes will be looked for. However the market does not always move in the right direction. For example, the reopening of coal mines could become convenient, yet for the moment coal continues to be a more dangerous and polluting combustible than oil. Thus politics must play its part. The proposal of a world carbon tax – the proceeds of which can finance a UN plan to promote the research of alternative technologies and to help developing countries finance the public goods they need – is the most suitable solution to the world challenge. If the enemy we must fight is the excessive presence of CO₂ in the atmosphere, all citizens should clearly understand what the costs are and what the remedies proposed by those have the governing responsibility are.

Nonetheless, for the time being, the decisions taken at world level and by the European Union do not show any serious will to implement a world plan for sustainable development. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the UN, claims that the carbon tax should amount to between 20 and 50 dollars for each ton of CO₂ generated by the taxed combustible.

The European Union has been trying to reach the reduction of air pollution by means of a *cap and trade* system, which is not sufficiently effective. As a matter of fact, the European Commission does not have the courage to face the issue of a carbon tax, to avoid being in contrast with the expectations of national governments to maintain absolute sovereignty over financial resources (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). In the meantime, the OECD (2008) published a report in which it claims that the cost of an environmental policy at world level, by means of a carbon tax modulated with different rates for rich and poor countries, the objective of which consists in putting an end within 2030 to the present trend of increasing pollution (including the destruction of biodiversity), would be 0.03% of the annual growth from 2008 to 2030. This means that in 2030 we will have renounced to only 1% of the total growth attainable. This is what it costs to save the Planet. These are suggestions that should encourage a determined political action. Yet, national governments seem to be more interested in competing among themselves, at times using violence, to accumulate riches within their national frontiers rather than considering the fact that all the countries of the Planet, one day, may no longer have resources to exploit.

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A Global Climate Community as a Step towards World Federation

John Pinder

In the first half of the twentieth century Europe, which had established the westphalian system of sovereign nation-states, devised in the seventeenth century to put an end to the terrible wars of religion, became the cockpit for the yet more terrible world wars. But since 1945, Europe has become the safest region in the world, dealing with the problem of its own internal security by the process of incremental federalisation: replacing the absolute sovereignty of the states within the Community, now the Union, by a sharing of sovereignty in common institutions in a growing range of fields where cross-frontier interdependence has rendered the sovereign member states increasingly unable to deal with their problems. While the fields of this integration have been mainly economic, and more recently environmental, the original motive and the continuing effect has been to remove completely the fear of war among the states and thus to enhance the sense of security of the citizens.

But the world as a whole remains an increasingly dangerous place in which wars, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, failed states and mass migration caused by poverty, as well as other cross-frontier problems, have now been joined by climate change which may well be the most dangerous of all; and the world, which imported from Europe the westphalian nation-state system, is ill-equipped to deal with them. The United Nations and other international organisations, based on the principle of absolute sovereignty, are not effective enough; and in many states the conditions that make a federalising process feasible do not yet exist. But the conditions do exist among enough states in the world to render practicable the idea of a global climate community (GCC), global in the same aspirational sense as the original group of six European member states, now en-

larged to twenty seven, was from the outset called the European Community.

The project of a Global Climate Community

The aim of this short paper is to suggest that the European Union, with its experience of building a structure of federal powers and institutions by steps and stages, is uniquely qualified to initiate a similar process in the wider world to address effectively the need to prevent disastrous climate change. In addition to this experience, the Union has itself played the leading part in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and gone far to develop its own advanced system for controlling carbon emissions; and it remains the world's leader in the second round of these negotiations.

The argument has seven main points: controlling climate change as the objective; federal policy instruments to achieve this; federal institutional elements to ensure their just and effective use; a critical mass of states that are ready and willing to found a vanguard core; the EU and India as initiating partners; and the federal development and enlargement of the GCC towards the world federal finalité.

Controlling climate change as the objective

The European experience has shown that security is the fundamental, existential motive that induces states to share sovereignty, while the economy and the environment are the first fields in which sovereignty is likely to be shared. This is not in practice paradoxical, because although control of armed force has been seen as the basic instrument for the security of nation states – the citadel of sovereignty – and hence much harder to transfer to federal institutions than the less challenging economic and environmental powers, the replacement of state power by the rule of law within a Community as the ultima ratio in these latter

fields has changed relationships in ways that have removed the fear of war between the member states.

Climate change is now probably a greater threat than war to the survival of human beings and is already becoming perceived as such. But this motive for building federal structures does not threaten a traditional citadel of sovereignty. The objective is, moreover, precisely defined, particularly in reports of the UN's International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), with limits to the rise in temperatures to 2 degrees centigrade and to that of parts of carbon per million in the atmosphere to 450. The Union has adopted the target of reducing carbon emissions by 60 per cent by mid-century and this has been well enough received by European public opinion. The economic argument that there are gains for the first in the field of transition to the new, low-carbon economy also appears more compelling in the light of the Stern Report's conclusion that the cost of guarding against excessive climate change is around 1 per cent of GDP whereas the cost of failure could eventually amount to 20 per cent.

So the Union is among the best prepared to deal with climate change, committed to reduce emissions by 60 per cent by 2050, and quite likely to hit its interim targets for cutting emissions by stages towards that amount. It is also quite likely to accept the principle of equity among the member states of a Global Climate Community, essential if the currently less-developed are to accept the constraint of limiting the growth of their low carbon emissions, by the commitment of richer states with currently higher emissions to converge on a share of global emissions based on the principle of equal emission rights at a sustainable level for all citizens.

Federal instruments

Christopher Layton has shown how the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the Union's principal instrument for reducing carbon emissions (Layton, 2007). Just as from 1952 onwards the European Coal and Steel Community used a rules-based market mechanism for those two products which then provided the in-

dustrial basis of military power, thus achieving both economic and security ends, so the European Union is employing a market mechanism in the interests of both climate security and economic rationality. Layton has also shown how the ETS could benefit from a GCC “central bank” with the specific function of controlling the financial aspects of the trade in rights for carbon emissions (Layton, 2007, p. 20).

The ETS is accompanied by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), designed to encourage the transfer of carbon-saving forms of production to enterprises in the less-developed countries: a useful measure, provided that its use is not sanctioned in cases which do not result in an adequate net reduction in carbon emissions.

Another useful market mechanism would be a common market within the GCC for products aimed specifically at the low-carbon economy, in order to stimulate their use and production and to offer benefits for relevant sectors of the economy.

Since equity is a sound basis for a community and essential to encourage less-developed countries to participate, a further merit of an ETS for a global community is that the total size of the allocations issued in each member state can be adjusted to ensure movement towards a common average level of allowances there by a target date of, say, 2050.

A further instrument, which is favoured by the United States, is a climate change fund or investment bank, for encouraging the development of low-carbon methods of production, which could be used to assist such developments in less-developed states in particular. That could be a useful supplement for a GCC but not a substitute for an effective ETS.

A GCC would also need instruments for its relations with non-member states. It would have a strong interest in being able influence them to adopt measures for reducing carbon emissions as effective as its own. Thus forms of association could include elements of membership, leading towards full membership for states that are ready and willing. There is also likely to be pressure for levies on imports from states that gain an unfair advantage by avoiding costs of carbon emissions borne by participants in the ETS: a green form of anti-dumping duties.

Federal institutions

That summary of some instruments which a GCC would need indicated what would be required of the institutions responsible for their use. The ETS is the most prominent example of the need for institutions capable of taking difficult political and legislative decisions, such as the distribution of rights among the member states. The experience of the EU indicates that policy formation will require an executive institution considerably stronger than the secretariat of an international organisation; a council of ministers will have to take some essential decisions by qualified majority vote; and, as EU experience has shown, decisions of the GCC will need the consent of the citizens, so a parliamentary assembly will be needed, increasingly, as the scope of the Community's activity increases, with rights of codecision. Actions of the Community will have to be subject to the rule of Community law, under the jurisdiction of a GCC court.

The founding treaty will be a legislative act, as will the adoption of measures for the development of the ETS; and the institutions will have to be responsible for substantial public expenditure. It is therefore fundamental that the Community should be securely based on the rule of law, requiring an independent Court of Justice, to which legal persons as well as Community and member state institutions should have access.

In short, the institutions will have to be based on principles of federal democracy, with an executive responsible to a legislature representative of the states and of the citizens, and with an independent judiciary as guarantor of the rule of law.

Member states

Membership will be for those states that are ready and willing; ready, implying that they are liberal democracies, able to participate in institutions for representative government and the rule of law, and thus to share sovereignty in a way that authoritarian regimes are unable to do; willing, in that they accept the

conditions of membership. Since it is a vital interest for the GCC that such states should meanwhile go as far as possible in cutting their emissions, it should use its influence to persuade them to do so in every possible way, from treaty commitments following the Kyoto protocol to forms of association with more binding commitments.

The EU and India as initiating partners

A partnership between France and Germany was the essential core for the establishment of the European Community. A single hegemonic member state would inevitably dominate a community, which could therefore not develop in a democratic federal manner. Nor should a community containing regions with markedly different characteristics be dominated by one of them. France and Germany were of similar size and represented the prevailing northern and southern European cultures. The two together were moreover sufficiently weighty to give credibility to the project to which they were committed.

The world's carbon emissions during this century will be dominated by four entities: the EU, China, India and the United States. So the crucial first step in establishing a global climate community will be for two of them to be ready and willing to commit themselves to the general principles of the project. Since it is not possible for authoritarian polities to share sovereignty under the rule of community law, China will not be ready until it has developed an appropriately democratic polity. Nor, just as the UK was not willing to join the original Six in founding the European Community, is the United States likely to be a willing founder of a GCC with federal characteristics. The EU and India do, however, share the commitment to representative government and the rule of law; and they play leading parts in the two main groups with differing perspectives on the Kyoto process: those with more-developed (figuratively "northern") economies, which have to cut their carbon emissions per person to reach the sustainable level; and the less-developed, whose concern is to

continue economic growth at rates that will enable them to catch up with the North. So both the EU and India are ready; and between them they contain a quarter of the world's people. The challenge for federalists is to persuade them to be willing.

The federal development of the GCC and the world federal finalité

Since the world's most renowned federation was established fairly fully-fashioned by the Philadelphia Convention, it is often assumed that the policy of federalists must be a similarly instant, "big bang", establishment of a federation rather than a process of continuous creation. The "instant" method is, however, particularly difficult in establishing federations that include states with a history of up to several hundred years or, in the case of China, millennia. So the European Community, now Union, has developed a way of establishing a polity with increasingly federal characteristics by introducing federal powers and institutions and including new member states by steps and stages; and the European Council has just agreed to initiate a further set of steps. The defect of this form of federalism is that it may never achieve a satisfactory federal democracy with appropriate federal powers. Its merit is that it can actually produce results such as the Union has done so far and can provide a launching pad for eventual reform into a satisfactory federation.

As Altiero Spinelli put it in his speech to the *Camera dei Deputati* on 10 February 1977, in the debate on the approval of the direct elections to the European Parliament, "the European Constitution will be completed progressively by steps such as this"; and already in 1952, he had identified the original federal elements in the European Coal and Steel Community, when drafting Jean Monnet's inaugural address as the President of its High Authority. For Spinelli, a world federation was and remained the ultimate goal; and Monnet saw the European Community as "only a stage on the way to the organised world of tomorrow", in which "the problems of the present" could no longer be solved by "the sovereign nations of the past" (Monnet, 1978, p. 254).

The project of the Global Climate Community gives federalists of today the opportunity to provide a powerful impulse both to the further federal development of the European Union itself and to the launching of a similar process in the world at large.

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Appendix on Ecology and Federalism

John Pinder to Guido Montani

London, 14 December 2004

Dear Guido,

thank you so much for sending me *Ecologia e Federalismo*, which I have read with much interest. You ask for my opinion and my judgement and I hope you may find them of some help to your own thinking.

You rightly emphasise the strength of the political forces that resist the federation of existing nation-states. It follows that there has to be a powerful motive to overcome their resistance. Your book expounds very clearly, particularly in the opening and the concluding parts, the existential challenge that confronts mankind in the ecological field and explains that the only effective response is world federal government. You are also right to observe that I have been working on similar topics, although my efforts have been concentrated on the particular problem of global warming or, more generally, climate change.

Your book places that concern in the wider context of the relationship between mankind and nature. By a remarkable coincidence, I have very recently read the most relevant parts of a book by my Russian friend, Professor Yuri Shishkov, which is devoted to that same relationship (*Reshayuschiye Polveka v Istorii Chelovechestva – Decisive Half-Century in the History of Mankind*). Although his ideas about global institutions do not go beyond the conventional approach of the Brundtland Commission, I found his work very relevant to my concern with the idea of a global community for sustainable development, with powers to tackle the menace of climate change. For it deepens and strengthens

that case by placing it in the wider ecological and environmental context, which is rightly a priority for many good people who are concerned about the world's problems without yet relating them to the need for institutions that lead to world federation. Perhaps the enclosed copy of the letter I wrote to him will show how it relates to the original motive for my world federalism. Of course your book helps specifically to place the problem in the perspective of its federal solution.

You perform a valuable service by introducing this dimension into federalist theory. I hope you will find that what follows may help towards its further development.

Just as Hiroshima, as terrible existential challenge, motivated my espousal of world federalism, so the second world war, following so soon after the first one, motivated the postwar strength of the support for federal Europe among so many politicians as well as citizens (including myself). Without that, I do not think that the six governments would have accepted Monnet's proposal for the European Coal and Steel Community which, as the Schuman declaration put it, "would make it plain that war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible". Although the rule of law under Community institutions developed for half a century mainly in the economic field (though with some extension into, *inter alia*, environmental protection), it had enormous political consequences. You rightly observe in your book that war among the member states remains unthinkable; and many steps have been taken towards a federation.

Reflecting on this experience in the context of my original commitment to world federalism, I developed the idea of a global community for sustainable development which would be launched through the initiative of the European Union, with India as its great democratic partner (following the European example of France with Germany), but with the US initially absent (as was the UK from the European Community). I think you have a copy of the chapter I wrote in the late 1990s on "The Rule of Law for a Uniting World: a Global Community for Sustainable Development". Also reflecting on the European example of

the need to respond to an existential challenge by transferring powers from hitherto intransigently sovereign states, it occurred to me that the establishment of such a community could provide the breakthrough to the development of a series of steps towards federation at global level, as has occurred following the establishment of the ECSC in response to the existential challenge of war among Europeans (I enclose a brochure on the organisation called Action for a Global Climate Community (AGCC), which we founded a year ago and which has, among other things, already secured support from some eminent German scholars in the field as well as members of the European Parliament and some important Brits, and has organised a high-level conference in New Dehli). An essential feature of global warming in the connection is that the crisis is expected to come to a head within half a century, i. e. within a time scale that could motivate urgent political action, rather than the centuries that apply more generally to the relationship between man and nature (as indicated in your p. 97).

I think it was the vast challenge of the prevention of further war that brought Albertini to identify peace as the supreme value of federalism, among all the other values which he recognised (some of them listed in my article in *Il Federalista* on his contribution to federalist thought), and which you illuminatingly identify as those human rights that can no longer be guaranteed by individual nation-states. But the supremacy of peace over other values did, perhaps, lead to a certain undervaluation, in the hamiltonian tradition in Italy, of the achievements of the Community with respect to other rights pertaining to human welfare, with the accompanying de facto contribution to peace; and this led in turn to a tendency to undervalue Monnet's contribution to federalism through providing by steps and stages a growing basis of federal elements in the Community's institutions and powers, thus at the same time demonstrating their usefulness. I think that you make a very important contribution in drawing attention to the importance for federalists of the ecological dimension, which can become as decisive as war in affecting the right to life as well as to many other values.

I doubt, however, whether it is helpful to underline the difference between the federal system required to protect the right to life by preventing war from that required to prevent ecological disaster. The essential principle in both these two fields, as in all others where government is needed to deal with the problems that cross the frontiers of nation-states, is democratic government that applies the rule of law to both citizens and states. What these two fields have in common is that the motive for making such a radical systemic change is literally existential for mankind and, in the ecological case, perhaps for life on earth: hence, as the European experience of creating the Community and Union has shown, capable of mobilising enough support for real progress in changing the political system.

Recognition of this second existential challenge, which is now more strongly felt by many Europeans than the existential challenge of war, opens up a powerful new opportunity for the next great phase of federalisation on a wider global scale. It should at the same time motivate Europeans to complete the European federation in order to create a source of real power for acting to build the world federation, including the overcoming of American policy in its present imperial and destructive phase and thus helping the Americans to return to the liberal approach, which Spinelli forecast, at Montreux in August 1946, would result from a true partnership with a federal Europe. (Perhaps Albertini would now have extended the principle that peace is federalism's supreme value to include the right to life, protected against ecological disaster as well as war).

This letter is already more than long enough. The short message is that I hope you will continue to pursue the thinking outlined in the book, strengthening the ecological case as an essential component of contemporary federalism.

John Pinder

PS – Could you send a copy of the book to Christopher Layton, Chairman of AGCC?

PPS – Governance is not government, just as confederation is not federation. But we need words to describe the process of moving towards federation through the confederal phase, while guarding against the tendency to confuse the two.

Guido Montani to John Pinder

Pavia, 15 May 2005

Dear John,

I apologise for the delay in answering your letter of December, which I was pleased to receive because it has many intelligent considerations about my book on ecology. I wrote to you the first time to ask you to be patient so that I could send you an articulated reply. The MFE Congress kept me totally busy. However, now that the Congress is over and the MFE strategy, has been decided on, also in view of the French referendum, I can finally answer your observations.

I think there are two main issues to be discussed: the opportunity to form a first group of countries for a “Global Climate Community” and the relationship between federalism, peace and ecology.

As far as the proposal for a Global Community is concerned, in your 1999 essay (*The Rule of Law for a Uniting World: A Global Community for Sustainable Development*) you claim that, since not all the countries in the world want to immediately take part in an initiative to control carbon dioxide emissions, as shown by the Kyoto Protocol, it appears to be more realistic to start from a nucleus of countries that are more determined and more interested, as the Europeans did with the ECSC. It is very likely that China will exclude itself from this initial group of participants – despite the fact that its industrial development is not a negligible cause of greenhouse gas emissions in the Planet – since its political regime is certainly not going to accept sub-

stantial reductions in sovereignty. For similar reasons, the USA will not accept the limitations deriving from a Climate Community, given its role as a superpower, which it wants to continue to exert. To sum up, the nucleus of a Community for global sustainable development should initially be formed by the European Union and India. If this nucleus of countries carries out effective policies for sustainable development, the remaining countries will follow the example and become part of the initial nucleus.

I think that this proposal is moving in the right direction and that, if world politics offers a chance to launch a concrete plan, as Jean Monnet did in 1950 with coal and steel, it should be immediately taken. Nonetheless, I think there is a difference between the ecological issue, in particular the one concerning greenhouse gas emissions, which is naturally global, and the issue of European unification. This difference could make the formation of an initial group of countries unfeasible, because they must have a strong political motivation to unite. Monnet's proposal was of historical importance because it involved France and Germany, the two countries at the root of the major European wars. The European Coal and Steel Community was decisive for the beginning of the process of European integration, not only because important economic and energy resources were shared, but mainly because in this way France and Germany were showing their will to turn the course of European history, by starting a peace process the result of which should have been federal unity. Thus, with the ECSC the success of the initiative depended entirely on the good will of France and Germany to continue in this direction until the end. In this way, Europe also gave a substantial contribution to the peace process in the world, as is written in the preface of the ECSC Treaty. However the decisive impulse came independently from the Franco-German initiative.

If I well understand your proposal, the Global Climate Community should not be formed with the explicit objective of becoming, in time, a community of destiny, in other words a Federation. Initially, it will simply be a vehicle to solve the urgent issue of global warming with supranational institutions. If this

interpretation is correct, the difference compared to the ECSC is substantial: while the six countries of the ECSC started a peace process, the realisation of which depended entirely on their will, the countries which will give birth to a nucleus for a Global Climate Community must persevere an objective that does not entirely depend on what they will do, because greenhouse gas emissions are a global issue. The Kyoto Protocol proves that global dynamics are inevitable. Thanks to Russia's ratification, the Protocol has entered into force with the substantial contribution of the European Union and Japan, but with the exclusion of China, India and the USA. The USA are the greatest polluters in the world (with 25% of the total carbon dioxide pollution). The partiality of the Kyoto Protocol is one of its main faults (the other relates to the insufficient reduction objectives of polluting emissions). As a matter of fact, in Europe there is a strong resistance of industries and governments to apply the Protocol, fearing the loss of competitiveness with American companies, which do not have to sustain the same costs for de-pollution. On the other hand, even in the USA there is an initial awareness that, should the threats of global heating come real in the long run, the American industry and the local authorities (cities and states, like California) might find themselves forced, in a very short space of time, to make drastic provisions, with consequent considerable damage. Thus the American Federal Government is beginning to have second thoughts. In short, if the problem is global, the solution must be global. The motivation behind the birth of the European Community was mainly the construction, in the long-term, of a political community, a Federation. The reason that would justify the birth of a Climate Community is limited to the solution of a specific problem, which is global in nature. It is difficult to think that a group of countries will take the responsibility for a problem that can be solved only if all the peoples of the Planet reach a common agreement.

These considerations give me an opening to tackle the second issue: the relationship between federalism, peace and ecology. I am sorry that from my book you may have got the impression that it is not "useful to emphasize the difference between a fed-

eral system necessary to protect the right to life with the prevention of war from what is necessary to prevent an ecological disaster". I did not mean to claim that there are different forms of federal governments to solve different problems. If my text lends itself to this interpretation, I am sorry. In truth, I only meant to highlight the need for a federal world government to face the great emergencies imposed by the globalisation process with different "means". I attempted to summarise the three major issues that a world government will have to face in this way: guarantee the right to peace, the right to solidarity and the right to life. Peace among peoples, the solidarity of rich countries towards the poorer ones and the implementation of sustainable development for the survival of life on the Planet I think are the three crucial matters on which the future of humankind will depend. Let us once again consider the Kyoto Protocol. The agreement is lacking because the most industrialised countries, which pollute more, did not ask the developing countries (like China and India) to reduce their emissions. It is obvious that these peoples have the right to improve their material life conditions, as the Europeans and Americans did in the past centuries. On the other hand, an effective policy of world solidarity for development today has been rejected by the richer countries because of its excessive cost (for the UN, about 0.5% of the world GDP), whereas those same countries do not back away from spending much greater amounts of money for weapons (3 to 4% of the GDP, depending on the countries). We live in a world where the priority is the search for security from the threats of other human beings. The state of war conditions every other choice.

The interdependency of the issues obviously concerns the choices a world government must make. However, we must be aware that the means for a solution of the various problems are different. In politics, those who want to reach a goal should also has to want the means. For this reason it is necessary to explain that the solution for the ecological issue requires the power to plan on a planetary level based on the opportunity: a) of guiding great economic choices in order to safeguard natural resources (e.g. research and investments in energy sources as an alternative

to the exhaustible and polluting ones); b) the provision of some global public goods to protect nature, when it is not possible to resort to the market (such as a park which includes tropical forests or a few marine areas, to guarantee biodiversity). These are “means”, i.e. powers that a world government must endow itself with if it wants to guarantee the right to life, and they differ from the means necessary to guarantee peace (for example a world police force) and the fight against poverty (e.g. a UN budget sufficient to reach the Millennium goals the UN decided on).

I hope these observations will clarify that I continue to believe that peace is the supreme value of federalism, as Albertini claimed. Nonetheless, by studying the ecological issue one can glance at some of the problems that humankind will have to face even if a world Federation is created. We cannot, a priori, claim that a world government will be able to guarantee the survival of the human species and of all the other species unless, together with the idea of the political unity of humankind, we become aware of the arrogance of scientism, which expects to solve everything and control everything: scientism does not coincide with wisdom. Humanity has conquered the power to destroy the Planet. But it does not pose itself the question of guaranteeing what it has not created and which, very likely, it will never be able to recreate, if it destroys it. Karl Popper wrote, somewhere, that man is not God and he should know that. Contemporary politics, unfortunately, shows that men who believe themselves to be omnipotent and immortal like the gods of ancient times govern us. A greater awareness of the place that humankind occupies in the cycle of nature may make us less arrogant and a bit wiser.

I hope I have answered your objections adequately. However I am aware that the issues we are discussing are complex and deserve further considerations, on our part and of that of other federalists.

Guido Montani

PS – If you agree, I think it would be useful to publish our letters including your answer to this letter.

John Pinder to Guido Montani

London, 3 November 2005

Dear Guido,

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter of 15 May. The main reason is that I wanted to explain better my view of the relationship between the specific project of a Global Climate Community and the great causes of European and world federalism. I was hoping that we would have an opportunity to discuss this in person. But your suggestion that our letters might be published induces me to delay writing no longer.

The fundamental element in the relationship between the Global Climate Community and federalism is that the GCC is intended to be the start of a process of developing its membership, until a world federation is achieved. The chapter to which you refer, in which I initiated the idea, envisaged that the GCC (initially global in the same sense, of aspiration, as the original Community of the Six was European) would develop “by extending the range of its competences, both in the environmental field and in those of economics and conventional security, as well as by reform of institutions to make them more effective and more democratic”, in the process of creating “a federal union with universal membership” (John Pinder, “The Rule of Law for a Uniting World: a Global Community for Sustainable Development”, in Willem J.M. van Genugten et al. (eds), *Realism and Moralism in International Relations*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999).

Thus the aim of the proposal for the GCC was not limited to dealing with the problems of climate change, any more than the European Coal and Steel Community was intended only to resolve the problems of coal and steel. The aim was, rather, to follow that example by selecting the most promising field in which agreement could be secured to start the process of global federalisation. It is true, as you say, that it is difficult to deal with them separately. But the same has applied to the problems

of peace in Europe and of the European economy. The economic route which the founder members took after the events of 1954, however, basing an important part of their economic relations on the rule of law under the prefederal Community institutions, did much to remove the fear of war among them by transforming their power relationship in matters of Community competence. The GCC, based on the rule of law in matters within its competence, would likewise have a benign effect on the relationships between its member states, helping to establish a culture of peaceful relations among them, based on the rule of law, which could serve as an example for the rest of the world.

As regards solidarity, the Global Climate Community could not be formed without addressing the needs of sustainable development. For the richer countries, that would require legislation and policies to promote energy-saving in both production and consumption, including the necessary research, investment and market framework to ensure that the development would be economically viable (and if necessary anti-dumping action to prevent unfair competition from states which prefer to continue their lethal pollution unchecked). The poorer countries would require assistance for their economic development towards the new, low-carbon economy. Without that, even fast-developing countries from the South such as India would not be likely to accept the obligations of membership; and the assistance could have an important impact on their prospects for development. It would not be too hard for the EU, which already provides four times as much development aid as the US and is committed to target of 0.7 per cent of GDP, to contribute its proper share of the necessary funds in order to make a serious start towards saving ourselves as well as the rest of the world from the potential disasters of climate change. A GCC investment bank, along the lines of the European Investment Bank, could moreover fund suitable investments at favourable interest rates.

Of course it would be good if the new community could deal initially with problems beyond those of climate change

and related solidarity. But as Europeans were able to start their federal process with a Community initially only for coal and steel, but which had the capacity to develop into the Union of today, why should a wider group, based on the vast problem of climate change, not form the basis for progress towards a federation with the necessary competences and universal membership?

Those are some grounds for identifying a key sector such as climate change in which to start a federalising process that should lead, as it has done in Europe, to the further building of federal elements into the powers and institutions of a global community and the enlarging of its competences and membership with the final destination of a world federation.

You are also sceptical about the relevance of an initial less-than-trivial universal community to start this process by addressing a global problem such as climate change. You accept the potential value of a concrete plan to initiate a federal process among states that are ready and willing, i. e. that the approaches of Spinelli and Monnet can be complementary (as Spinelli did when he wrote Monnet's inaugural speech as president of the ECSC's High Authority). But you doubt whether a less-than-universal community could contribute usefully to deal with the menace of climate change, citing the example of the European Community as a European solution to the European problem of wars between France and Germany. The guarantee of peace between France and Germany within the Community has indeed been of priceless benefit. But peace in Europe, which depend as much on peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, was not only a European problem. What the Community, now the Union, has done is to build a framework with enough federal elements to ensure that the French and Germans, together with other Europeans, would continue to live in peace and deal with other problems together, even when war with the Russians no longer seemed to be a threat.

The greatest dangers facing mankind now include ABC weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and other threats to peace; grinding poverty in many countries; and climate change.

The GCC would make a major contribution to dealing with the latter, while at the same time building a political system in which the federal elements could be developed and the membership and competences be enlarged; and it could meanwhile exercise a strong influence on non-member countries, through its example, its policies, and arrangements such as association.

You suggest that it is necessary to wait for agreement among all the world's peoples before taking any such action, and that the Kyoto accords demonstrate that a global dynamic in this field seems inevitable. But a dynamic sufficiently effective to deal with climate change has, *inter alia*, to ensure that carbon emissions are cut by half by the middle of this century; and this requires, not just intergovernmental agreements, but binding commitments which can ensure the rule of a community law and the necessary legislation: that is to say federal elements of the community type. It is hard to believe that such a community can be established with universal founder membership. The European Community would never have been created if the founders had waited for the British or the Central and East Europeans before they began, it is most likely that the Americans would react to the GCC as the British did to the European Community; and there will probably be a lengthy delay before the Chinese are prepared to accept the sharing of sovereignty under a Community rule of law. For both the United States and China, a close association with the GCC is the most that can be expected for some years ahead – though its establishment could well accelerate a change of policy, particularly in the United States, as the creation of the European Economic Community did in Britain.

A democratic Community cannot, however, be based on the hegemony of one powerful member, such as the EU would be without a weighty enough partner; and India is the most suitable partner for initiating its foundation. The proposal for a Climate Community has been well received there and Indians should be persuadable if the EU tries seriously to persuade. Along with other likely participants, the GCC would then account for a bigger share of global carbon emissions than the states that now

participate in the quota system which is the effective part of the Kyoto agreements.

Along with completing its own federation, the EU's mission must surely be to lead the world in the process of building a world federation. In December 2004, the EU Council declared, in its statement on "A secure Europe in a better world", that the Union's aim was to "contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world". But such a system will begin to be sufficiently effective only in so far as it incorporates enough federal elements in its powers and institutions; and among the world's major actors, it is the Union that has the necessary know-how, together with the potential to provide a strong enough impulse in that direction. It is also worth remembering that independent India's first great political leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a convinced world federalist; and India itself is a functioning democratic federation.

The EU led the world in the agreement on the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent ratification. So it should be capable, even with its present, prefederal institutions and powers, of leading a further step beyond. But its ability to secure commitment to develop the GCC among a core of founder states will be the greater the more it strengthens the federal elements in its own arrangements for external policy. There is an interdependence between the federalisation of the Union's external policy system and that of the wider multilateral system: both because the more federal the Union's institutions and powers for conducting its external policy, the better it can promote the process of global federalisation; and because the progress towards a safer world which the Union is eminently qualified to lead is also a most powerful motive for the process of completing the European federation. I believe, indeed, not only that the Union is uniquely placed to give the main impulse to the process of global federalisation to secure peace, justice and acceptable living standards throughout the world as well as an adequate response to climate change, but also that this is the vision which can motivate Europeans at all levels, from citizens to governments, to share the will to proceed towards creating a genuinely

European constitution. And I suggest that a European initiative for launching the GCC would be an important move in that direction.

With all my best wishes

John Pinder

About the Authors

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